The goal of this chapter is to examine the operation of a twoprogram safety net for workers in Texas that consists of the combination of unemployment insurance (UI) and the Supplemental Nutrition Assistance Program (SNAP), formerly known as the Food Stamp Program. We try to understand the operation of this joint safety net in part by examining very large data sets consisting of all persons in Texas supported by one or both of these programs over a 12-year period. The goal of discerning the joint safety net's operation can be daunting, but it can be understood as a series of simplifying assumptions. As we progress through the topics in this chapter, it is in some sense a walk through a series of assumptions toward an application at the end, with the hope that we learn a number of things along the way.
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We begin this chapter with an overview of the Great Recession's impact on the two safety net programs in Texas. We then convert data on individuals' receipt of program benefi ts over time into spells. We broaden the defi nition of spells to include periods of time in which benefi ts were received from either UI or SNAP, or both; we refer to these periods as joint safety-net spells. Next, we classify the voluminous spells in two ways. First, we collapse all joint spells into one of four broad patterns determined by whether the recipients accessed one or both programs, and in what order. Next, we classify spells by looking at the macroeconomic environment in the time period in which the spells occurred. Here we divide our study into three broad periods: 1) prerecession, 2) recession, and 3) jobless recovery. The fi rst two are likely familiar to most people. The third period, jobless recovery, we defi ne to refer to the period of time between when the recession offi cially ended and nominal growth began, and continuing as long as the policy of making UI benefi ts available for extended durations was kept in place. Finally, we illustrate the data by plotting income fl ows over time for joint safety-net benefi ciaries, before, during, and after their use of these programs. We then conclude the chapter by applying these tools to a policy question that Texas is uniquely positioned to answer: what happens to able-bodied adults without dependents (ABAWDs) when they are subjected to varying policies on exemptions from the general rule placing strict time limits on their receipt of SNAP benefi ts?
THE GREAT RECESSION'S IMPACT ON THE LONE STAR STATE
Texas is the second largest of the 50 U.S. states (after Alaska), with a land area of 261,232 square miles, and the second most populous (after California), with 28,701,845 residents (U.S. Census Bureau 2018) . Texas shares an international border with Mexico and has unique geographic and demographic characteristics that in recent years have helped lift its economy. Four factors have driven the growth of jobs in Texas since the late 1980s: 1) rapid population growth resulting from a high birth rate and international immigration; 2) low housing costs and population density due to land availability and lending regulations; 3) abundant oil and gas resources; and 4) its prime location along the Mexican border, which encourages trade and job growth (McNichol and Johnson 2012) .
Unemployment in Texas
While the Great Recession offi cially began in December of 2007 and ended in June of 2009, its impact varied across states, both in timing and in magnitude (see Figure 10 .1). During the Great Recession, the U.S. unemployment rate more than doubled, from an average of 4.6 percent in prerecession 2007 to a peak of 10.0 percent in postrecession 2010. However, increases in the Texas unemployment rate, refl ecting a shorter recession and stronger job growth during the recovery, were somewhat subdued relative to those of the nation as a whole. From prerecession rates of as low as 4.2 percent in 2007, the Texas seasonally adjusted unemployment rate doubled to a high of 8. 4 percent in 2009 4 percent in (BLS 2019 .
During the recovery, the unemployment rate decreased slowly but steadily in the state and the nation. The Texas seasonally adjusted unemployment rate declined 4.2 percentage points from its peak of 8.4 percent in 2009 and stood at 4.2 percent in April 2015, just below its prerecession average of 4.3 percent in 2007 4.3 percent in (BLS 2019 . Texas had Year (January ticked) Gray shading shows recession United States Florida Georgia Maryland Michigan Missouri Texas the second-highest over-the-year job increase (287,000) in the United States during the period from April 2014 to April 2015 (BLS 2015) .
Unemployment Insurance in Texas
Prior to the recession in 2007, about 7.6 million U.S. workers who lost their jobs started receiving UI benefi ts. During the recession, this number increased substantially and peaked at about 14.1 million in 2009 but declined to about 7.8 million workers in 2013. Similarly in Texas, the number of workers who lost their jobs and started receiving UI benefi ts increased from a seasonally adjusted average of about 280,000 workers in prerecession 2007 to a peak of about 714,000 workers during the recession in 2009, then declined to about 450,000 workers in 2013 (USDOL 2017) .
As discussed in an earlier chapter, the total number of UI recipients each year went up during the recession not just because of the increase in the number of new recipients, but also because unemployed workers received those benefi ts for longer periods. Eligible workers received benefi ts for longer periods for two reasons: 1) fi nding work became more diffi cult and 2) they could receive UI benefi ts for an extended period (CBO 2012). The share of UI recipients in the United States who exhausted their regular benefi ts, which in most states lasted for 26 weeks, increased from about 36 percent in prerecession 2007 to a peak of about 55 percent during the recession in 2009, and it subsequently fell to 45 percent by 2013. In Texas, the share of UI recipients who exhausted their regular benefi ts grew from 37 percent in prerecession 2007 to a peak of 60 percent during the recession in 2009 and fell to 49 percent by 2013 (USDOL 2017).
In Texas, three factors infl uenced the fl ow of UI recipients: 1) the maximum number of weeks available under the regular UI program remained consistent throughout the time period at 26 weeks, 2) the Extended Benefi ts program was in place between May 2009 and May 2012, and 3) the EUC program was in place between July 2008 and December 2013. Figure 10 .2 presents smoothed estimates of total UI recipients in Texas with stacked line graphs broken down by program (using data from the Employment and Training Administration's 5159 Report), along with the stacked bar graphs showing the number of benefi t weeks available from each of the three UI programs. The periods during which EUC08 and EB were available overlap closely with the periods in which the 5159 data record recipients in each of those programs. 1
SNAP in Texas
Food security for a household means access by all members at all times to enough food for an active, healthy life. Food-insecure households are those that at times during the year are uncertain of having, or unable to acquire, enough food to meet the needs of all their SOURCE: USDOL. The USDA's food and nutrition assistance programs increase food security by providing low-income households access to food, a healthful diet, and nutrition education. SNAP is the largest of these programs and is a central component of American policy to alleviate hunger and poverty (Cunnyngham 2016) . The program's primary purpose is to increase the food purchasing power of eligible low-income households to improve their nutrition and alleviate hunger and malnutrition (Rosenbaum 2013) . As a means-tested program, SNAP is one of the federal government's primary countercyclical programs, expanding during economic downturns and contracting during periods of economic growth. In general, the percentage of the population on SNAP closely tracks the poverty rate and, to a lesser degree, the unemployment rate (Oliveira 2015) .
The onset of the Great Recession in Texas in early 2008 (slightly later than in other states) brought a fall in SNAP case closings but no large increase in case openings (see Figure 10 .3). On the other hand, late 2009 saw both an increase in openings and a decline in closures, with a consequent surge in the caseload. Again, despite the nominal economic recovery starting in late 2009, SNAP caseloads in Texas continued to increase well after it had formally been declared that the recession had ended. The number of caseloads fi nally peaked in late 2011.
SAFETY NET SPELLS
In studying the operation of these two safety net programs, the concept of individual spells of receipt is an important simplifying assumption. We defi ne safety net spells in order to characterize individuals' receipt of benefi ts over time. A spell consists of a relatively continuous period of consecutive months of benefi t receipt, with the provision that single months of nonreceipt within a larger spell are smoothed over and counted as a continuing spell.
To test the operation of the joint safety net, we defi ne spells in such a way that they refl ect benefi t receipt from either program in any given month. Thus, receipt of either SNAP benefi ts or unemployment benefi ts in a month is regarded as evidence of spell continuation. We also smooth over one-month gaps as described above, which eff ectively means that a spell ends only when one experiences two full calendar months of benefi t nonreceipt from both programs.
Patterns of Participation in Joint Spells
When one defi nes spells based on participation in one program or another, or both, on a monthly basis, looking for patterns can be potentially overwhelming, given that there are tens of thousands of possible combinations of paths taken. We (Schroeder 2011 ) and our research partners (Hefl in and Mueser 2013) have had some success in creating categorization schemes for analyzing such spells, and we have found some interesting patterns in the resulting outcomes data. In retrospect, however, the schemes we used tended to yield too many categories whose usefulness for describing outcomes did not seem to extend much beyond two factors: 1) how the spells started and 2) which components were accessed. Thus, in the interest of parsimony, we have simplifi ed our scheme for categorizing joint participation in SNAP and UI into four patterns:
1) The UI-only group received only unemployment insurance benefi ts during the spell.
2) The UI-fi rst group received both UI and SNAP benefi ts during the spell, but it received only UI in the fi rst month.
3) The SNAP-fi rst group received both SNAP and UI benefi ts during the spell, but it received SNAP in the fi rst month. Members of this group may or may not also have received UI in the fi rst month.
4)
The SNAP-only group received only SNAP benefi ts during the spell.
Note that the order in which we have described these patterns of joint safety-net use roughly corresponds with the expected relative affl uence levels of those likely to exhibit the patterns. Thus, those making use of UI-only benefi ts were expected to have had the stron-gest work histories with the highest preprogram earnings. Among those receiving UI fi rst, we expected to see strong workforce attachment and, perhaps for some, a reluctance to apply for food benefi ts right away that eventually gave way to need. Among those receiving SNAP fi rst, there were likely many working poor, whose earnings are chronically too low to disqualify them from long-term use of SNAP but who at some point lost their jobs and had to access UI as well. Among SNAP-only recipients, most would have been expected to be unemployed or earning too little, too sporadically, to have qualifi ed for UI. Of course, one expects signifi cant variation in income as well as other characteristics in all four of these groups, but the general trends noted here may prove useful in interpreting outcomes based on this classifi cation.
Moving forward, we use this scheme to organize the description of joint safety-net users' characteristics as well as outcomes. While one might expect that the primary interesting results to follow will be those involving recipients in one of the two groups who receive benefi ts from both programs, UI-fi rst or SNAP-fi rst, it is worth noting that the UI-only and SNAP-only groups also represent little-studied populations. Whereas most studies done on SNAP or UI separately will, knowingly or not, include in their samples recipients of the other program, here we focus on groups that received one benefi t to the exclusion of the other.
Characteristics of Joint Safety-Net Recipients
In this section, we present characteristics of joint safety-net recipients broken out by their participation patterns, as defi ned in the previous section (Table 10 .1). We do not attempt to describe the characteristics of joint safety-net participants as a whole, in part because of the heterogeneity among these groups, and in part to facilitate comparison across states, since some states in our group do not have data on the UI-only group. In examining recipient characteristics, we exclude censored spells in order to better frame the work done on spell dura-tions later. We also restrict our examination to the last spell for each recipient during the time period of the study to ensure that recipients with multiple spells during the time period are counted only once.
The average age of recipients in all four groups was similar, ranging from 35 years in the UI-only group to 40 years in the UI-fi rst group. While the UI-only group comprises mostly men, the distribution of men and women in the UI-fi rst group is even. In contrast, the SNAP-fi rst and SNAP-only groups are made up mostly of women. The distribution of race across all four groups was similar, with a few notable diff erences: the proportion of white recipients was lowest and the proportion of black recipients was highest in the SNAP-only group. The proportion of Hispanic recipients was highest in the UIonly group. We examined whether recipients had ever been an able-bodied adult without dependents (ABAWD) in the current spell or any prior spells and found that the proportion was notably high across all the groups. In the UI-only, UI-fi rst, and SNAP-fi rst groups, about a third of recipients had at one time been classifi ed as an ABAWD; the proportion was slightly lower, at 28 percent, in the SNAP-only group. The experiences of ABAWDs in Texas are examined in greater detail in the fi nal section of this chapter.
We also examined the preprogram employment and earnings history of recipients. A vast majority of recipients in the UI-only, UI-fi rst, and SNAP-fi rst groups were employed in the prior quarter, compared to only a little over a third of recipients in the SNAP-only group. Looking at the average earnings in the prior quarter, we found that recipients in the UI-only and UI-fi rst groups had the highest preprogram earnings, followed by recipients in the SNAP-fi rst group, while recipients in the SNAP-only group had the lowest preprogram earnings. About 41 percent of recipients in the UI-only, UI-fi rst, and SNAP-fi rst groups had experienced an earnings dip (defi ned as being a dip of at least 20 percent) within the prior eight quarters, whereas only 30 percent of recipients in the SNAP-only group had experienced an earnings dip.
These fi ndings about the earnings histories of recipients support our conjecture that the patterns of joint safety-net use would correspond to the relative affl uence levels of recipients. That is, UIonly recipients were likely to have had the strongest work histories, UI-fi rst recipients were likely to have had strong workforce attachment, SNAP-fi rst recipients were likely working poor, and SNAPonly recipients were likely unemployed or earning too little or too sporadically to qualify for UI. Of course, the patterns discussed here are collapsed across all economic conditions experienced during the study period. In the next section, we dig further to see how patterns of pre-and postspell incomes vary by the macroeconomic conditions in which their spells started.
The Joint Safety Net and the Economy
In this section, we examine joint safety-net spells in terms of the macroeconomic environment in the time period during which the spells occurred. Here we divide our study into three broad periods: We defi ned jobless recovery to refer to the period of time between when the recession offi cially ended and when nominal growth had begun, and continuing as long as the policy of making UI benefi ts available for extended durations was kept in place. For Texas, this included either EB or EUC08 benefi ts, the availability of which fi nally ceased in December 2013. Although we know of no precedent for treating this fi nal time period separately from other nonrecessionary periods, or periods when the economy is technically growing, this recovery in the face of high unemployment was a relatively new phenomenon, which we felt justifi ed its inclusion as a separate group.
Using this classifi cation, we could examine basic descriptive information on joint safety-net spells of the four types of participation patterns. We then illustrated the data by plotting income fl ows over time for joint safety-net benefi ciaries before, during, and after their use of these programs.
Spell trends
We start by looking at trends in the distribution of new safety-net spells across participation patterns under diff ering economic conditions. Table 10 .2 shows, for each combination, the average number of new spells per month, counting only completed, uncensored spells. As expected, all four types of safety-net spells became more frequent during the recession, as compared to the prerecession period. On the whole, spell starts were 27 percent more frequent during the recession. Somewhat surprisingly, spells overall were even more frequent in the jobless recovery period; however, most of this was due to increased frequency of SNAP-only spells. UI-only spells represented the only type that substantially declined in frequency subsequent to the recession. Finally, in confi rmation of patterns seen in studies by Schroeder (2007) and Gould-Werth and Shaefer (2014) , spells that combined UI and SNAP were more common during the recession (11.9 percent of new spells) than in the prerecession period (7.4 percent). Combined SNAP and UI spells continued to be more common (10.6 percent of new spells) during the jobless recovery period. Thus, the fi nding that recipients were more likely to combine SNAP and UI benefi ts during recessionary periods appears to be robust, and the tendency extends to the jobless recovery period as well. Next, we examine the durations of joint safety-net spells. Table  10 .3 shows average spell durations occurring in each of the four participation patterns, broken out by the macroeconomic conditions under which the spell started. Note fi rst of all that UI-only spells were by far the shortest. Averaging 3.6 months prior to the recession, these spells nearly doubled in length during the recession, then remained nearly as long during the jobless recovery period. UI-fi rst spells followed a similar pattern. Recall that people in this group received UI only in the fi rst month, then also received SNAP later during the same spell, so their spells were understandably longer than UI-only spells. Safety-net spells among those receiving UI fi rst averaged nearly 13 months prior to the recession, rose to over 17 months during the recession, and dropped back to 14 months in the jobless recovery period.
Whereas the UI-only and UI-fi rst patterns followed standard economic expectations of safety-net utilization by workers over a recession-and-recovery cycle, spell durations among those receiving SNAP fi rst were more peculiar. In this group, the longest spells, averaging over 27 months, occurred during the prerecession period, while SNAP-fi rst spells during the recession were shorter at 24 months, and jobless recovery spells were shortest at 17 months. SNAP-only spells were considerably shorter than SNAP-fi rst, but they followed a similar pattern, getting progressively shorter-from the prerecession, to the recession, to the jobless recovery period. While these patterns might seem to make little sense given the macroeconomic conditions, we may see in the next section how these could be interpreted in terms of changes in the characteristics of the population utilizing the benefi ts.
Income fl ows
Next we examined income fl ows over time by plotting average monthly income totals from three sources, beginning six months prior to the beginning of the joint safety-net spell and continuing for 18 months subsequent to the begin date. This type of chart stacks the income totals so one can readily grasp the relative contributions from each source, as well as the total across income sources, at each point in time. Incomes plotted include unemployment insurance benefi ts, summed across weekly payments to the calendar-month level; SNAP benefi ts provided; and monthly earnings as estimated from quarterly UI-reported income. In interpreting these charts, it is important to keep in mind that, for example, at any given point beyond the spell begin date, some safety-net spells are still ongoing and some have ended, and we are looking at the average across all of them. Moving still farther to the right on the chart, one fi nds that some have even restarted new spells. By taking the average across individuals, we can get an idea of the group tendency of continuing reliance on benefi ts and potentially increasing earnings as time progresses. UI only. Figure 10 .4 shows income fl ows over time for UI-only safety-net participants prior to the recession. This shows the unemployment insurance program as it operates in normal, expansionary economic times. Note how earnings levels, which earlier had averaged around $1,600 per month, began to dip several months before the safety net was accessed. This is a clear illustration of the earnings dip phenomenon fi rst noted by Ashenfelter (1978) . From As an aid to better quantifying the earnings patterns we observe in these charts, Table 10 .4 displays the average earnings for selected pre-and postspell intervals. This table estimates baseline earnings from four to six months prior to the safety-net spell beginning, for the most part omitting the earnings dip from this estimate. Followup earnings are estimated 16 to 18 months after the spell started, regardless of whether the spells had been completed or not, as a way to compare outcomes across categories with spells of varying durations. Thus, we see that UI-only recipients in the prerecession period managed to regain 78 percent of their former earnings levels after one-and-a-half years. Again, this illustrates the UI program operating as designed during economic expansion, helping workers with shortterm cash fl ow after they lose their jobs, until they can get back on their feet.
Next, we examine the joint safety-net spells of UI-only recipients that started during the recession. Recall that their spells averaged six UI compensation SNAP Earnings months in duration, substantially longer than prior to the recession. Figure 10 .5 illustrates the income fl ows over time. While the general trends were similar to those in the prerecession chart, two important diff erences emerge. First, the average prespell earnings were signifi cantly higher, averaging almost $500 a month more than those of prerecession UI-only spells. This strongly suggests that a shift in the population accessing these benefi ts occurred in response to the recession, so that UI-only recipients during the recession come from higher-earning backgrounds. Second, we fi nd that a year and a half after their spells started, recipients regained a smaller share of their prior income (58 percent) compared to those recovering from prerecession spells (78 percent). Since these fi gures refl ect unconditional earnings, they represent a combination of employment and earnings eff ects. Thus, we may conclude that UI-only recipients during the recession either were less likely to have regained employment or did so at reduced earnings rates subsequent to their safety-net spells.
Next, we examine joint safety-net spells of UI-only recipients that started during the jobless recovery period, the income fl ows for which are illustrated in Figure 10 .6. One has to look carefully to confi rm that Figure 10 .6 is diff erent from Figure 10 .5. In fact, the statistics reveal them to be quite similar. Jobless recovery UI-only spells averaged UI compensation SNAP Earnings 5.7 months in duration, as compared to 6.0 months for recessionary spells, and their prespell earnings were similarly high, suggesting that the trend of previously higher-earning recipients continued into the jobless recovery period. One diff erence, however, is that jobless recovery UI-only recipients did manage to regain a higher percentage of their former incomes, which, at 74 percent, is more in line with the 78 percent seen for prerecession spells.
UI fi rst.
Having explored UI-only recipients' experiences under all macroeconomic conditions, we now turn our attention to the joint safety-net spells of those who receive UI fi rst. Recall that recipients in this group receive UI exclusively in the fi rst month but later receive SNAP as well during the same spell. We saw earlier (Table 10 .3) that UI-fi rst recipients had safety-net spells that were three to four times longer in duration than their UI-only counterparts. Indeed, UI-fi rst recipients in the prerecession period received benefi ts for an average of 12.8 months, as compared to 3.6 months for similar UI-only spells. Figure 10 .7 shows income fl ows for UI-fi rst recipients among spells starting before the recession. Note that, despite the longer durations, the pattern generally resembles the income fl ow charts for the UI-only group, with the strong earnings dip that is reasonably well fi lled with unemployment compensation benefi ts. One clear diff erence is that SNAP benefi ts make a substantial contribution to income throughout the recovery period. Table 10 .5 lists measures of pre-and postspell earnings for those experiencing UI-fi rst safety-net spells. The pattern generally follows that of UI-only recipients. UI-fi rst recipients in the prerecession period averaged $1,560 per month, and despite their longer spells, they had recovered 76 percent of the prior earnings a year and a half after their spells started.
Next, in Figure 10 .8 we examine the income fl ows for UI-fi rst recipients in spells starting during the recession. Again we see the familiar pattern of a large earnings dip, with earnings reaching a nadir several months after the spells began. As before, we also see higher 0 500 average prior earnings, as compared to prerecession spells, again confi rming that the recession brought higher earners into contact with the safety net. A major diff erence this time is the large and continuing contribution of UI compensation to income over time, which continues at a high level to the edge of the chart. At month 18, this is near the limit of UI benefi t durations for one spell (see Figure 10 .2), so it is likely that this high usage of UI benefi ts so long after the spells began refl ects a combination of both long UI spells and recipients cycling back into UI from another job loss. Table 10 .5 confi rms that members of this group had regained only 51 percent of their prior earnings after one-and-a-half years. Next, we examine those using UI fi rst whose safety-net spells started during the jobless recovery. Recall that safety-net spells among those receiving UI fi rst average nearly 13 months prior to the recession, over 17 months during the recession (Figure 10.8) , and 14 months in the jobless recovery period. Thus, the UI-fi rst recipients in Figure 10 .9, whose spells started in the jobless recovery, continued to rely on the safety net for most of the follow-up period displayed. And again, the income-fl ow patterns strongly resembled those who received UI fi rst during the recession, with UI compensation making a large and continuing contribution toward closing the income gap, even a year and a half after the spell started. Visual examination suggests that earnings recovery may have been swifter in the jobless recovery period, but ultimately those receiving UI fi rst in the jobless recovery regained only 60 percent of their prior income levels.
SNAP fi rst. Next, we turn our attention to the third joint safetynet participation pattern, SNAP fi rst. Recall that this group consists of those receiving SNAP in the fi rst month of their safety-net spell while also receiving UI benefi ts either in the fi rst month or later in the spell. As noted earlier in Table 10 .3, spell durations among those receiving SNAP fi rst were the longest of all groups, and they took on a peculiar pattern. The longest spells among SNAP-fi rst recipients, averaging over 27 months, occurred during the prerecession period, while SNAP-fi rst spells during the recession were shorter at 24 months and jobless recovery spells were shortest at 17 months. Figure 10 .10 shows income fl ows for those receiving SNAP fi rst whose safety-net spells began prior to the recession. Note fi rst of all that all the income fl ow charts are scaled the same, so that diff erences in average income levels are readily apparent. One striking feature of Figure 10 .10 is that prespell earnings were quite low, averaging under $900 per month, well below any seen for those spell patterns starting with UI. The other striking feature is that the earnings dip was present but shallow and quite gradual in comparison to UI-only and UIfi rst spells, and the same was true for the recovery period. Recall that safety-net spells for this group averaged more than 27 months in duration, so most were still ongoing beyond the time covered by the chart. Table 10 .6 shows earnings trend statistics for those experiencing SNAP-fi rst safety-net spells. Here we see that for the SNAP-fi rst group utilizing the joint safety net prior to the recession, the combination of a gentle earnings dip and slow but steady earnings recovery resulted in their regaining 95 percent of their prior earnings. This statistic would be more impressive if their earnings had not been so low to begin with. Altogether, this pattern suggests that prior to the recession, those receiving SNAP fi rst tended to be working but poor, whose low earnings made them chronically eligible for SNAP assistance. Figure 10 .11 shows income fl ows for those receiving SNAP fi rst whose safety-net spells started during the recession. The average safety-net spell for this group was over 24 months, so most spells persisted beyond the period covered by the chart. The fact that those receiving SNAP fi rst during the recession had shorter spells (24 months) than those receiving SNAP fi rst prior to the recession (27 months) is probably best explained by a shift in the composition of this group in the direction of more income. Indeed, prior earnings averaged over $1,200 per month among those receiving SNAP fi rst during the recession, 40 percent higher than their prerecession counterparts. Despite their higher prior earnings, the income fl ows suggest little or no income recovery over the safety-net spell, combined with a continuing high reliance on both SNAP and UI for replacing lost income. Income fl ows for those receiving SNAP fi rst in the jobless recovery period are illustrated in Figure 10 .12. Continuing a theme from recipients of UI-only and UI-fi rst spells, we fi nd once again that UI compensation SNAP Earnings income fl ows among SNAP-fi rst recipients in the jobless recovery period are almost indistinguishable from recipients whose SNAP-fi rst spells started during the recession. The jobless-recovery SNAP-fi rst recipients did manage to end their spells sooner than other SNAPfi rst spells, averaging 17 months, but this was still at least as long as any other group we studied. Overall, the diff erences we observed between those receiving UI fi rst and those receiving SNAP fi rst are quite dramatic for two groups whose members made use of the same benefi ts. Consider that the major diff erence between these two groups was timing. The UIfi rst group started with UI and for whatever reason delayed their use of SNAP benefi ts by a month or more. In contrast, those using SNAP fi rst sought these benefi ts at least as early as they sought UI benefi ts, if not earlier. That we observe such major diff erences in their spell durations and eventual outcomes makes a strong argument for the classifi cation system presented here and maintaining a distinction between SNAP fi rst and UI fi rst. Consider the alternative: one large group of those who combine SNAP and UI benefi ts, regardless of order, would be quite a heterogeneous group. Such a classifi cation system would not off er much predictive value. SNAP only. Finally, we consider the group of safety-net participants who made use of SNAP benefi ts exclusively during their spell, a group we refer to as SNAP only. While a small subset of this group may have had experience with UI benefi ts during the interval over which we followed them, they did not utilize UI during the spell on which we focus here. As noted in the discussion of Table 10 .3, SNAPonly spells are considerably shorter than SNAP-fi rst spells, but they follow a similar pattern, getting progressively shorter in duration from the prerecession (10.8 months) to the recession (10.0 months) to the jobless recovery period (8.7 months). Figure 10 .13 illustrates income fl ows among those using SNAPonly prior to the recession. In comparison to all the income fl ow charts seen thus far, the striking features here are very low earnings 0 500 throughout the period, with little or no detectable earnings dip prior to the start of the safety-net spell. In fact, it is diffi cult to tell from these data what the precipitating event for the safety-net spell may have been. It is possible that some utilizing the SNAP-only safety net were employed in ways not observable to the UI system, such as uncovered industries or informal work arrangements. In any case, there was apparently little documentable income in this group. Table 10 .7 shows earnings statistics among those receiving SNAP only. Among those receiving SNAP only before the recession, prior earnings were so low ($383 per month) that there was almost no way to go but up. Thus, they regained 146 percent of their earnings but still earned a paltry $560 per month a year and a half later.
Next, we examine income fl ows among those using SNAP only with a spell starting during the recession. Figure 10 .14 shows this group to have had slightly higher earnings, consistent with ear- lier fi ndings showing those with higher historical earnings utilizing safety-net programs during the recession, but this eff ect was more muted among SNAP-only recipients. Arguably the eff ect in this group was limited because of the additional UI eligibility that accrued to those with higher earnings, which would tend to make them more likely to utilize benefi ts in the SNAP-fi rst pattern instead. Finally, looking at the income-fl ow patterns among SNAP-only participants in the jobless recovery period, shown in Figure 10 .15, it becomes evident that the earnings and benefi t histories of those using SNAP varied only a little with diff ering macroeconomic circumstances. Regardless of the period in which their safety-net spells started, they showed low prior earnings, very little evidence of earnings dips, but steady use of SNAP and steadily growing earnings to the point that all showed gains in earnings. It almost appears as if some members of the SNAP-only group were refl ected at a low point in their economic lives, in which case their histories shown here might reveal little more than their earnings regressing toward the mean. For most, it likely refl ected their low earning potential, which tended to make them eligible or near-eligible for SNAP, along with the occasional income shock like a job loss that precipitated a new spell. In this section, we have seen how patterns of joint UI and SNAP safety-net utilization can be characterized in one of four patterns that prove useful for organizing their outcomes. We have found, for example, that small diff erences in timing among groups who combine SNAP and UI benefi ts can presage large diff erences in later outcomes. Of course, we are not in a position to draw causal inferences from these diff erences, but the patterns observed here could lead to rigorous tests of potential interventions that could link these two safety-net programs more closely.
We also have seen how program participation patterns and outcomes for safety-net recipients during the period we refer to as jobless recovery more strongly resemble those of recipients during the Great Recession than those of the prerecession period. Despite the fact that the economy was technically regarded as having grown from late 2009 onward, some of the worst eff ects of the recession had yet to occur, including the peak SNAP caseloads in Texas, and arguably peak food insecurity as well. This pattern of fi ndings provides confi rmation that treating this period as distinct from the expansionary prerecession period should prove useful to future research. Many researchers, present authors included, in their prior study of program dynamics have aggregated postrecession spells together with prerecession spells on the assumption that the common factor among the two, a growing economy, made such aggregation logical. They may not have understood the heterogeneity of the resulting groups, nor the extent of the infl ated error variance they invited into their models by failing to treat these groups separately. Whatever factors led to the jobless recovery, the fi rst instance of which arguably appeared after the 2001 recession but on a smaller scale, it is clear that it is a diff erent animal, the eff ects of which we may need new policy tools to address.
Next, we turn our attention to a policy question that, in part because of questionable policy choices made in the face of the Great Recession, Texas is uniquely positioned to answer: what was the experience of nonworking ABAWDs in areas that were exempt from time limits, as opposed to the vast majority of nonworking ABAWD recipients who were subjected to strict time limits on their receipt of SNAP benefi ts?
A FOCUS ON ABAWDS IN TEXAS

ABAWDS and SNAP
Since 2008, the fastest-growing group in the national SNAP caseload has been able-bodied adults without dependents, or ABAWDs (Zedlewski, Waxman, and Gundersen 2012) . The Personal Responsibility and Work Opportunity Reconciliation Act of 1996 (PRWORA) limits the receipt of SNAP benefi ts to three months in a three-year period for ABAWDs who are not working and are not participating in and complying with the requirements of a work or workfare program for 20 hours or more each week (USDA 2018c). But the provision neither required states to off er workfare programs or job training to people who were unable to fi nd a job nor provided funds to states for that purpose. Most states do not off er these programs, in part because operating a work program with enough slots for everyone at risk of hitting the three-month time limit is regarded as too expensive (Bolen et al. 2015) . As a result, what was initially labeled a "work requirement" has essentially become an austere time limit of three months of assistance for poor unemployed workers, many of whom want to work but cannot fi nd a job (Rosenbaum 2013) .
Most of those aff ected by the three-month limit are very poor, with average monthly income of approximately 19 percent of the poverty line (about $2,200 per year for a household of one in 2014). Many have little or no income other than SNAP and qualify for no other benefi ts because they are not raising minor children. In most of the United States, SNAP is the only safety net available to unemployed childless adults with little recent work history. ABAWDs are more likely than other SNAP participants to lack basic job skills like reading, writing, and basic mathematics (Bolen et al. 2015; Rosenbaum 2013) .
ABAWDS and Time Limit Exemption Waivers
States have the authority to exempt individuals using a federal 15 percent exemption authorized by the Balanced Budget Act. The American Reinvestment and Recovery Act of 2009 (ARRA) suspended the ABAWD time limit nationwide beginning April 1, 2009, and continuing through FY 2010. States may also request a waiver of this provision for people in areas with an unemployment rate above 10 percent or for those in an area with insuffi cient jobs; many states qualifi ed because of the Great Recession and its aftermath and waived the time limit statewide (USDA 2018c).
From April 2009 until September 2010, the three-month limit was temporarily suspended in most of the United States. In FY 2008, about 1.1 million able-bodied adults without dependents received SNAP benefi ts. In FY 2009, when the time limits were fi rst suspended, the caseload for this group rose 60 percent to 1.7 million adults. The next year, the caseload shot up another 233 percent to 3.9 million adults (Zedlewski, Waxman, and Gundersen 2012) .
All project states except Texas sought and received approval for statewide suspension for the fi scal years following the period authorized by ARRA. Texas chose to continue its policy of annually requesting waivers for a short list of counties meeting the high unemployment thresholds. We will discuss Texas's waiver policy in more detail in the analysis section, below.
To get a sense of the prevalence of ABAWDs, the share of SNAP cases that are ABAWDS was tabulated for the years 2002 through 2013 for all project states and for the country as a whole, using the SNAP Quality Control (QC) data assembled by Mathematica Policy Research. 3 Despite the shortcomings of these data for state-level comparisons, a clear pattern emerges in comparing Texas to the other project states. The ABAWD share of the SNAP caseload increased dramatically for most project states during the recession, but it stayed relatively steady in Texas at under 5 percent throughout the recession. In the United States as a whole, by comparison, over 15 percent of the SNAP caseload consisted of ABAWDs by 2013, nearly doubling the caseload share from 2008.
ABAWDS in Texas
Here we ask the question, "Why did Texas's ABAWD caseload not show growth in line with other states in response to the Great Recession?" We will test the hypothesis that Texas's peculiar implementation of its ABAWD waiver policy resulted in hardship for some recipients, who were cut off from benefi ts despite not fi nding suitable employment. If this proves to be a plausible account, the hardship they suff ered could have been avoided, as Texas left signifi cant federal money on the table by failing to apply for statewide ABAWD exemptions.
In order to answer these questions, we assembled data to allow us to study the Texas ABAWD population in detail. These data include the SNAP, UI earnings, and UI benefi ts administrative records data used throughout this chapter, as well as policy data collected for this purpose. Texas's SNAP records readily identify ABAWDs who are or are not meeting work requirements on a monthly basis. And Texas fi les a SNAP Employment and Training state plan every year, setting out parameters of program operations, including a list of highunemployment counties for which waivers to the ABAWD time limits are requested for the coming year. 4 We located and utilized copies of state plans covering 12 years from federal fi scal years (FFY) 2003 through 2014. Note that the FFY 2015 state plan ended the practice of requesting ABAWD waivers for counties, so as of this writing there are no high-unemployment-county ABAWD exemptions in place in Texas.
Texas is composed of 254 counties. Ten counties were exempted from ABAWD time limits in FFY 2003, and 12 were exempted in FFY 2014. Counties tend to cycle on and off the list, but typically half or more of the counties exempted in one year tend to be exempted the next. The number of exempted counties reached a maximum in FFY 2012 at 27, and a minimum in FFYs 2009 and 2010 at 4. The counties in which exempted ABAWDs reside tend not to be heavily populated. The unduplicated number of individual ABAWDs receiving SNAP in exempted counties reached a maximum in FFY 2005 at 17,954 and a minimum in FFY 2014 of 12. 5 Approved waiver counties by fi scal year are listed in Appendix Table 10A .1.
The Texas SNAP Employment and Training state plans also contain a list of counties to be regarded as "minimum service" counties for the coming year. These counties tend to be sparsely populated, and thus diff erent rules apply in them, including frequent use of the 15 percent exemptions, because training opportunities are not made available in the area. To eliminate this unnecessary added complexity, we removed from our analysis ABAWDs in counties regarded as minimum service, including a small number of counties that are both ABAWD exempt and minimum service. This leaves us with two groups of counties for each FFY, which we utilized in our statistical models: 1) Waiver counties, including ABAWD waiver counties but not minimum service counties, and 2) Typical counties, including all nonwaiver, nonminimum service counties
In composing an analysis of ABAWDs, we thought it would be helpful to select a comparison group to provide some context for the statistics. We selected, from the SNAP caseload in the same two groups of counties, adults who met the same age and nondisability criteria as ABAWDs, but who diff ered only in that they have dependents under the age of 18 in their households and on their SNAP cases. Note that there was no matching involved, and thus the comparison group is not intended to allow causal inferences of any kind. Instead, the group provides context in which to view ABAWDs' outcomes.
ABAWD characteristics
In this section we present the characteristics of ABAWDs in Texas following the same methods we used in examining the characteristics of joint safety-net recipients earlier in this chapter (see Table 10 .8). We excluded censored spells, and we restricted our examination to the last spell for each recipient during the study period. We found that the average age of ABAWDS in Texas during the study period was 33. The gender distribution was nearly even among ABAWDs, and the race distribution was also even among the three main groups (white, black, and Hispanic). A little less than half of ABAWDs had been employed from four to six months before the start of the spell, with very low average monthly earnings of $483. About 40 percent of ABAWDs had experienced an earnings dip (of at least 20 percent) within the prior eight quarters. 
ABAWD SNAP spells
The obvious fi rst question to ask regarding the SNAP receipt dynamics of ABAWDs, given that some are exempted from time limits and some are not, is how long their SNAP spells last. Note that we confi ned our analysis here to spells of SNAP receipt, without regard to any receipt of unemployment insurance benefi ts that might have occurred. Analysis of ABAWDs' joint SNAP/UI safety-net spells, as done earlier in this chapter for all SNAP or UI recipients, must be deferred for future work. Table 10 .9 shows SNAP spell durations for ABAWDs and adults with dependents whose spells started in either waiver counties or typical counties, as described above. First we note that adults with dependents have far longer spells than ABAWDS-more than three times longer in typical counties. Adults with dependents were found to have far higher six-month recidivism rates as well, indicating that their SNAP spells also are more frequent than those of ABAWDs. Next, we note that SNAP spells starting in waiver counties were longer than those in typical counties, as expected, because of the high unemployment and poor local economic conditions that earned these counties their spots on the waiver list.
Most interesting, perhaps, was the half-month diff erence in SNAP spell duration between ABAWDs in typical counties and ABAWDs in waiver counties. Anyone who understands the ABAWD waiver exemption policy might be forgiven for expecting something resembling the opening of a fl oodgate in the contrast between these two cells. Instead, they would see a mere one-half month of additional SNAP receipt among ABAWDs, who should, according to policy, be exempted from the time limits. Is it possible that the unmet fi nancial needs of ABAWDs in these economically depressed counties were being quenched with an extra half-month of SNAP benefi ts? We shall see. Perhaps a better question is, how exactly are time-limit exemptions awarded in ABAWD waiver counties?
In the next two tables, we examine the extent to which the SNAP spells of ABAWDs and adults with children living in typical (Table  10 .10) and waiver (Table 10 .11) counties responded to macroeconomic conditions. In a sense, this is another way of examining the interaction of SNAP spells with the economy. As spells beginning in waiver counties themselves represent locally depressed economies based on geographic distinctions, so the spells beginning under different macroeconomic conditions represent temporally depressed economies based on the time period in which the spells began. Table 10 .10 illustrates how the typical SNAP spells of ABAWDs, subjected to time limits (but free of the infl uence of the waiver policy), interact with the macro economy. The patterns shown here reveal that ABAWDs received SNAP for slightly longer during the recession (3.3 months) and jobless recovery (3.4 months) than during the prerecession period (3.0 months). By contrast, the spells of adults with dependents grew shorter with the worsening economy, similar to the pattern found earlier for SNAP-fi rst spells, and likely refl ecting similar factors. Table 10 .11, on the other hand, shows SNAP spells starting within waiver counties, and thus nominally free of the time-limit policy, and how they interacted with the macro economy. ABAWD SNAP spells starting in waiver counties also were found to grow longer in response to the recession and jobless recovery, but not as long as one might expect if the time limit were truly being relaxed for these recipients.
So if the ABAWDs' SNAP spell durations did not increase much in response to waiver policy, nor were very responsive to bad eco- nomic conditions, is it possible that their incomes were buff ered in other ways? Figure 10 .16 illustrates known income fl ows for ABAWD SNAP spells in waiver counties. The pattern looks remarkably like those seen for SNAP-only participants earlier, with persistently low earnings, little perceptible earnings dip, and slowly growing earnings moving forward, except in this case, with little in the way of benefi ts to fi ll gaps between their income and expenses. As noted earlier, mean SNAP spell duration for this group was 3.7 months, and-not coinci- dentally-the point of highest cash fl ow on this chart was in the fi rst few months after spells began. If these ABAWDs in waiver counties had other sources of income that would improve this dire situation, they were not visible to us. Figure 10 .17 shows income fl ows for adults with dependents starting SNAP spells in the same economically depressed waiver counties. Recall from Table 10 .9 that this group's SNAP spells averaged 13.4 months in waiver counties, nearly 10 months longer than those of ABAWDs in these counties. Thus, it should not be surprising that their income fl ows as represented in these charts have a nice healthy layer of SNAP benefi ts in the middle (the light gray area in the fi gure) spanning almost the entire period. Underneath is an unimpressive earnings layer (dark gray) that looks remarkably like the earnings layer for ABAWDs in the same counties (Figure 10.16) . The primary diff erence between Figure 10 .16 and Figure 10 .17, in fact, is that one group received SNAP benefi ts according to its level of need, and the other received benefi ts for a few months at most, then these benefi ts ceased, regardless of continuing need. We could insert many more income fl ow charts here: we have countless charts that allowed us to compare the SNAP spells of ABAWDs and adults with dependents under varying conditions. But none of them tell a diff erent story from what we see above: two groups had similar earnings histories. One was determined to be eligible to receive continuing food assistance to meet the need, and the other was not.
On paper, the Texas ABAWD time-limit exemption waiver policy was supposed to allow some fl exibility for leniency in dealing with ABAWDs living in areas without suffi cient job opportunities. Though we have not seen extensive policy guidance on this, the spell duration data indicate that the manner in which the policy was implemented resulted in very little leniency in practice. SNAP benefi ts for ABAWDs appeared to run out well before the need was extinguished. It was not even necessary for Texas to be so restrictive with ABAWDs, as the statewide exemptions were there for the taking starting in 2009. It is diffi cult to imagine a universe in which it is good policy, in the face of the worst recession in decades, to turn away free money for the state's neediest citizens, who were actually the most likely to recycle it directly back into the economy.
CONCLUDING COMMENTS
In this chapter, we have demonstrated how spells of joint UI and SNAP safety-net utilization can be characterized in one of four patterns. We further show that these patterns prove useful for understanding and predicting outcomes for those utilizing one or both of these safety-net programs. Importantly, we fi nd that small diff erences in timing among groups who combine SNAP and UI benefi ts can presage large diff erences in later outcomes. The pattern of results here strongly suggests that programs or policies should be designed to link these two safety-net programs more closely. Considering this along with the fi nding that recipients tend to combine the two programs more under recessionary conditions suggests a clear hypothesis for the next study: that safety-net recipients may recover prior earnings levels faster when receiving timely benefi ts from both programs upon experiencing job loss or other economic stress. Interventions should be designed to link the programs more closely, and such programs should be subjected to rigorous tests to determine whether recipients get back to work and recover a substantial share or their prior earnings levels sooner.
In studying the interaction of the joint safety net with macroeconomic conditions, we found that even though the economy was officially determined to be recovering, safety-net utilization patterns and outcomes during the period we refer to as the jobless recovery were in many ways more similar to the recession than to the prerecession period. The economy was offi cially growing again as of late 2009, yet some of the worst eff ects of the recession had yet to occur, including the peak SNAP caseloads in Texas and, arguably, peak food insecurity as well. This pattern of fi ndings provides confi rmation that treating this jobless recovery period as distinct from other expansionary periods, including prerecession periods, should prove useful to future research. Whatever factors led to the jobless recovery, a lighter version of which appeared after the 2001 recession, it is clear that new policy tools are needed to address its eff ects on those who may be left behind by the eventual recovery. This task of developing new tools is urgent, as the next recession will inevitably come, and the eventual recovery that follows may be as jobless as the last.
Because of questionable policy choices made in the face of the Great Recession, Texas data reveal what happens to able-bodied adults without dependents (ABAWDs) when they receive little protection from strict time limits on their receipt of SNAP benefi ts. In comparison to other project states or the United States as a whole, while ABAWDs' share of the nationwide SNAP caseload swelled dramatically, Texas's ABAWD caseload share remained low, at well under 5 percent. We found that Texas did not actually have fewer ABAWDs than other states; rather, the very short durations of SNAP receipt in that state caused Texas to be underrepresented in the caseload count at any given point in time. As a result of this peculiar implementation of its ABAWD waiver policy, Texas likely worsened hardship for some recipients, who were cut off from benefi ts despite their inability to fi nd suitable employment. Worse, the hardship they suff ered seems to have been unnecessary, as Texas left signifi cant federal money on the table by failing to apply for statewide ABAWD exemptions at any point during the recession. We are aware of no other state that so thoroughly bypassed this opportunity to provide for its lowest-income citizens during the worst recession in modern history.
